Engine Room Fire Fighting: Explained With A Case Study

During training programs, we all have discussed at length and often come to varied conclusions about this issue. Should a single person who discovers the fire try to fight the fire all by himself /herself or call for additional help first?

If is often said that if the fire is small, the person discovering it should attempt to extinguish using the nearest available FFA, AFTER raising the alarm. But should it NOT be possible to restrict / fight the fire, discoverer should report to the muster station as soon as possible.

But it must be emphasised although this procedure may reduce the response time and be successful to extinguish or restrict the fire before it spreads.
Valuable time may be wasted by just the solitary person trying to extinguish an established fire, instead of raising the alarm and alerting
others. More significantly, the solitary fire fighter might himself/herself become a casualty because of the accumulated smoke and fumes.

Find
– Even if, only suspected, it is essential that the alarm is raised immediately so that the maximum fire fighting potential can be mustered at the shortest time.
Inform – Reporting of the location of the fire and either manual raising of alarm, or confirmation of an automatically generated alarm, and notifying the ECR /or bridge. Fire alarm switches / Manual call points are located at strategic points.
Restrict – Primary action of shutting off ventilation reduces of chances of additional air inflow, this is followed by application of suitable
extinguishing medium.

Owned by Superseven Shipping, Bahamas, and Managed by Baltimar A/S, Denmark.

Built in 1989 by Zhonghua Shipyard, China and classed with Lloyd’s Register (LR).

Overall length of 91.30 m Moulded breadth of 14.71 m Depth of 7.62 m. Summer draught of 4.99 m Deadweight of 3188 tonnes.

A single cargo hold and two deck cranes located forward of the accommodation superstructure. The ship can carry containers and other general cargo and has a capacity of 256 TEU

Feed pump supplies MDO from the service tank via flexible pipes (hoses) and a duplex filter to the fuel injection pump.

To keep the injection pump cool, more fuel than required is supplied with the excess fuel returning to the service tank via an overflow valve and hoses.

All of the system’s low pressure fuel lines are hoses with a braided wire outer layer and an internal fuel resistant rubber hose.

The high pressure side of the generator fuel system consists of solid drawn steel pipes. The injection pump supplies fuel via these high pressure pipes to each cylinder’s fuel injector.

The ship’s navigation bridge is equipped with navigational equipment consistent with SOLAS requirements.

GMDSS also located on the bridge and two very high frequency (VHF) radios, the equipment includes two satellite communications (Inmarsat-C) terminals.

The Ship had been chartered by Ok Tedi Mining, Papua New Guinea Amongst the containers stowed on deck were 45 TEUs packed with a total of 945 tonnes of ammonium nitrate (explosive used in the mining industry)

Ship’s crew of 10 consisted of the master, two mates, two engineers, three able seamen, a fitter and a cook. The master was Ukrainian while the remaining crews were Filipino nationals. The two mates kept a watch-keeping routine of six hours on and six hours off. At sea, the master assisted them by keeping watch from 0800 to 1200. The two engineers worked in the engine room during normal daytime working hours with one of them on call at other times for UMS operation.

Master confirmed to RCC that there were no injuries to the crew and that no fire fighting assistance was required.

WP24 Intrepid arrived in the vicinity of Baltimar Boreas and confirmed the ship’s status.

Merchant Vessel Takayama was allowed to resume its passage.

WP24 Intrepid then stood by in case any assistance, such as a crew evacuation, was required before the tug Wickham from Newcastle, responding to the RCC request, arrived in the area.

Chief engineer had started number two generator and determined that it was impossible to supply power to the main switchboard due to the seriously damaged electrical cables. The master reported the situation to the ship’s managers.

A tow line had been connected for the 40 mile passage back to Newcastle and WP24 Intrepid was then stood down.

With an additional tug assisting, the ship berthed at Kooragang berth number two.

The port authority required the ammonium nitrate containers to be discharged and a tug to attend the disabled ship throughout the discharge of its dangerous cargo

Cargo discharge was started with a shore crane. The ship’s emergency generator had been restarted but it only provided power for some essential services.

10th
February 2007, 1233 Hours

Cargo discharge was completed. The ship was then shifted, under tow, to Dyke berth number one to undergo repairs.

One of the failed hoses was fitted between the feed pump and the duplex filter (filter
hose) and the other hose led from the overflow valve to the fixed return line (return hose).

The return hose was found in two pieces. It had apparently separated when a temporary repair joining the two sections of hose
had failed. Analysis of the filter hose confirmed that it had failed due to mechanical rubbing or chafing
over a long period of time. The failure of one of the two hoses identified would have provided the fuel for the fire.

Leaking diesel oil from a failed hose would have sprayed over the top of the generator and some of it would have vaporised after making contact with hot surfaces on the generator engine.

The mist of vaporised diesel would then have been ignited by a very hot surface at a temperature greater than the auto-ignition temperature of diesel oil. Very hot surfaces on the generator engine were shielded by lagging and metal sheathing and included the engine exhaust pipe, manifold and turbocharger.

Design of Funnel Vent Fire DampersThe Vessel’s funnel vent fire dampers could NOT be closed remotely, with provision only for physically closing them locally.

Access was via a ladder (1) on the port side of the funnel, then by holding a rail while standing on another rail (2) and moving to the platform (3) on the aft part of the funnel.

Here, while standing on the platform about 12 m above the main deck, the two damper flaps could be closed shut.

Furthermore, closing the flaps required moving across an open vent at least once. With the emission of smoke, sparks and flame from the vents during the fire, closing the damper flaps was practically impossible.

This design flaw led exponential increase in the Damage due to the inability to isolate Air from the Fire.

• Maintenance of the flexible fuel hoses was inadequate. Inappropriate temporary repairs had been made and hoses longer than specified by the manufacturer had been used in the past. This had not been noted during previous surveys, audits and inspections.

• The generator manufacturer’s instruction book provided no guidance for the maintenance or routine replacement of the flexible fuel hoses.

Even The Vessel’s Safety Management System (SMS) provided no guidance for the maintenance or replacement of the generator flexible fuel hoses.

• Design of the fuel system was not in accordance to IMO guidelines which explicitly states that flexible hoses should be as short as practicable, their use be limited to only positions / locations necessary to accommodate relative movement in engine components

• The emission of smoke, sparks and flame from funnel ventilators just after the engine room fire started effectively cut off access to their locally operated fire dampers which prevented them from being closed. The closing arrangements for the ship’s funnel ventilators, therefore, did not comply with the intent of the relevant provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)